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Food retailing has become more concentrated and private label goods have spread over the 
last 40 years. 
Using a two-stage model i n which consumers become informed about the quality of the 
good only in period 2, we examine what determines the presence or absence of private label 
experience goods in supermarkets. 
Our most novel result is that in the case of products purchased infrequently, producing a 
reputable private label is not sustainable. 
Retailer bargaining power increases the likelihood of a private label good being produced.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Two major features of the retailing industry evolution in Europe over the last 40 years are 
increased  concentration and  the spread of private label products  . Successive mergers between 
distributors have led to concentrated retailing markets.  For example, i n France, the five biggest 
retailers accounted for more than 65 % of the food retailing in 2001, and in the United Kingdom, 
the CR5 was 56 % in 1996.
1 In addition to this increase in concentration in the food retailing 
industry, distributors have successfully launched private labels (also named store brands or own 
brands). In the UK, the average market share of private label  was about 41 % in volume for 2002, 
whereas in France it was 24 %.
2 One consequence of these dual trends in the food retailing industry 
is to increase retailers' bargaining power vis-à-vis the upstream sector. 
  However, looking more closely at the UK private label statistics,  some  products such as 
Beer, Lager & Cider (14 %) or Baby Food (4.3 %) show low penetration rates. In explaining such 
low penetration rates, the lack of confidence in the product (or in the retailer's brand relative to the 
national brand) is relevant – see Table 1, as described in Shapiro (1993). 
This suggests clearly that the characteristics of the good are important for the retailer’s 
decision whether or not to introduce a private label. In the food sector, most goods can be 
considered to be experience goods
3, in the sense of Nelson (1970);  that is,  sampling the good 
destroys it. This aspect of food purchasing has not been taken into account by the classical 
economic analysis of private labels where the store brand is always considered to be a search good.
4 
In such articles, for example Mills (1995) or Bomtems, Monier and Réquillart (1999), private label 
quality serves to discriminate final consumers demand and increases the competition between 
private label and branded products enabling the retailer to get input price concessions. However, the 
experience good characteristic of the private label provides an additional strategy to the retailer 
when considering the introduction of a store brand. As pointed out by Shapiro (1982 and 1983), 
with an experience good the retailer can cheat for some period on the quality sold to  consumers, 
since  they will only discover the true quality after some lag. The retailer therefore has an incentive 







                                                 
1 See Clarke et al.. (2002) for a description of European food retailing. 
2 PLMA's 2002 International Private Label Yearbook, prepared by AC Nielsen. 
3 Some of them may be credence goods where quality is never ascertained. Examples might include goods with health 
risks like meat for instance. Nevertheless, a credence good can be thought as an experience good where the lag between 
consumption and quality revelation tends to be infinite. 










PL market share 
under the 
average 
Health and Beauty  24.40%  l  lll  l 
Household  30.40%  l  lll  l 
Spirits and Liqueurs  25.80%  l  lll  l 
Hot Beverages  27.20%  l  ll  l 
Paper Products  19.40%  l  ll  l 
Dry Grocery  43.40%  l  l   
Beer, Lager and Cider  14%  ll  lll  l 
Light Wines  46.90%  ll  ll   
Soft Drinks  47.10%  ll  ll   
Delicatessen  79.60%  ll  l   
Frozen  46.30%  ll  l   
Confectionery  18.80%  lll  lll  l 
Pet Food and Care  16.30%  lll  lll  l 
Biscuits  41.40%  lll  ll   
Bakery  62.90%  lll  l   
Dairy  67%  lll  l   
Fruit  74.50%  lll  l   
Meat, Fish and Poultry  88.50%  lll  l   
Vegetables  58.40%  lll  l   
Table 1: Private label penetration in UK (AC/Nielsen and PLMA for the figures). 
 
  The objective of this paper is to examine  what determines whether a reputable private label 
will be produced, focusing on  frequency of purchase and retailer bargaining power, and  hence to 
see if there is a rationale for the retailer to milk its reputation on the store brand. 
  We first find that for products with low purchase frequency (or p roducts where the lag 
between consumption and quality assertion is high), a reputable private label is not sustainable. 
However, there is not a monotonicity of the introduction decision with respect to the private label 
production cost. In other words, a decrease in the cost of the own good can increase the incentives 
for the retailer to milk as quality chosen becomes closer to the one of the branded product and thus 
foregone future discrimination profits when milking are lower. 
  Second, when considering the retailer's bargaining power in the analysis, we find that an 
increase in the distributor's bargaining power can help him to sell a reputable private label. 
However, for low-frequency purchase goods, or credence goods, whatever his bargaining power, a 
private label is never reputable  enough  for  consumer because the incentives to milk are always 
higher than to maintain reputation. 
  This analysis casts some light on why reputation is an important characteristic in the 
economic analysis of private labels, and thus why branded products do so well in specific areas 
where brand name is really important for consumers, but not in other areas. 
 
  In the  next  section, we describe the framework of the model (consumer demand, retailer's 
options) and solve the t hree possible equilibria. The  subsequent  section derives the retailer's choice 
on the reputation issue. The  fourth  section incorporates  retailer  bargaining power  into the private 
label reputation analysis. Section five concludes. 4 / 4 
 
2.  The framework 
 
  In order to analyse the reputation issue, we consider two goods sold by a retailer to 
consumers on the final market, one branded, the other private label. Demand is vertically 
differentiated. We first describe the consumer's preferences, then the retailer's options. This section 
ends with the computation of the three possible equilibria. 
 
2.1  Consumers' demand 
 
  The retailer faces consumers differing in their willingness to pay for  product quality. The 
consumer's utility when she buys a unit of good of quality  q at price p is of Mussa-Rosen (1978) 
form: 
  (,) where  is the willingness to pay for quality Uqqp qqq =-   (1) 
We also assume that  [0,1] U q : . 
 
  When there is only one good, the consumer indifferent between consuming the good or not 
is characterised by  0 (,)0 Uq q = , that is:  0(,)
p
q pq q = . The retailer therefore faces demand: 
  0 (,)11
p
q Dpq q =-=-  (2) 
  In the case where consumers are offered two goods, one is assumed to be of high quality  q  
(and sold at price p ) whereas the other is of lower quality  q (sold at p ). The consumer indifferent 





- = % . There also exists a consumer indifferent between buying the low quality good  and 
nothing. She has  0(,)
p
q pq q = . 
 
Thus demand for the high quality good is defined by: 








%   (3) 
Similarly, demand for the low quality good is given by: 








%   (4) 
  At the equilibrium  both  goods are sold  as long as  (,)1 pq q < %  and  0 (,)(,) pqpq qq > % . This 
gives two conditions on prices to be satisfied: 5 / 5 
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2.2  The retailer's options 
 
  The central goal of this paper is to analyse the retailer's incentive to introduce a new product 
where quality is chosen by the retailer: a private label.  Since  when considering experience goods 
dynamics matter, we must distinguish three periods in the game: 
 
-  The first period is prior to the introduction of the new good: the retailer is assumed to 
have been selling a well-established (national) brand for some time.  
-  The second period commences after the  decision to introduce the new good has been 
made, and ends before consumers observe quality. 
-  The third period is the infinite horizon after consumers have observed quality and  so 
have decided whether or not to buy the new product again. 
 
  So far as the national brand is concerned, its name, the advertising done by the producer and 
the fact it has been consumed for previous periods make its characteristics well known to 
consumers. The quality of the branded product is normalized to  1 B q = . 
  In addition to this existing product, the retailer wishes to introduce its own brand product. 
However, because it is a new product, consumers will treat it as an experience good and will form 
prior beliefs on the quality chosen by the retailer. We give consumers' expectations the same 
structure as in Shapiro (1983). Consumers’ beliefs are updated according to the rule  1 tt Rq - = , 
where  t R  is t he retailer's reputation at date  t and  1 t q -  is the quality observed by consumers in the 
previous period. Moreover, this adjustment equation supposes that all consumers share information 
by communicating with each other. The quality o f the private label is publicly disclosed in the 
model
5. Note that consumers differ only in their willingness to pay for quality, not on the quality 
level of the product once consumed. The adjustment equation reflects the fact that consumers do not 
observe private label quality prior to purchase. A direct consequence is that the retailer can milk, at 
least for one period, by providing lower quality than that expected by consumers. This possible 
cheating strategy is clearly due to the one period lag between  observing quality and updating 
beliefs. In this paper, we look for the retailer's incentives to provide a reputable private label. 
Because what happens before the introduction of the private label does not influence the 
future, only two periods  are  relevant in the framework. Period  t=1 will denote the introduction  of 
the new good, and period t=2 encompasses the remaining periods after the private label quality has 
                                                 
5 One justification, given in Allen (1984), is consumers share information through publications like consumers' reports 
in magazines, market surveys or word-of-mouth reputation. 6 / 6 
been observed by consumers. The retailer's total profit can therefore be written as  12 pp P=+D  
where  1 p  is the profit made  in  the first period and  2 p  summarises all the profits made thereafter. 
The parameter  D is the composite discount factor between period 1 and the remaining periods 
encompassed in period 2.
6 The composite discount factor is important in capturing the difference 
between products. Indeed, for some products, the lag between the first purchase and any re-
purchase can be high ( for e xample,  Health and Beauty, Hot beverage, Household) whereas some 
other products are consumed more frequently (Dairy, Groceries). In our analysis, products with a 
low frequency of purchase are characterised by a low  D, and for frequently purchased products, the 
retailer faces a higher  D.
7 The national brand and the private label  are purchased equally frequently 
so there is no need to consider a different discount factor across them. 
 
2.3  The three possible equilibria 
 
  The technology faced by the national brand producer for the branded product leads to a unit 
cost of 
2 1
2 () BB cqq = . Since we assumed qB=1, the branded product unit cost is ½. The private label 
manufacturer is assumed to face the same technology (quadratic unit cost function in quality), but 
may  or may not be at a disadvantage relative to the national brand producer, as in Bontems, Monier 
and Réquillart (1999) or in Caprice (2000). Therefore, 
2 1
2 () SS cqcq =  with 
8
9 c > . We allow for a 
range of parameters for c which encompass both a disadvantage and a slight advantage. We assume 
that the manufacturer makes zero mark-up on the private label wholesale price. This is a classic 
assumption found in Mills (1995) or in Bontems, Monier and Réquillart (1999). 
  We also assume that the contract between the national brand manufacturer and the retailer is 
a two-part tariff. It is well known that in the absence of competition downstream, the result of a 
two-part tariff contract will be to set the wholesale price at marginal cost, so  wB=½. For the 
moment, we suppose the retailer has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it or leave-it offer to 
the branded product manufacturer. The franchise fee thereby allows the distributor to capture  the 
entire vertical surplus created from the national brand sale.
9 
 
                                                 









P=+ ￿ where d  is the period discount factor. But 
















 allows the profit to be rewritten as:  12 pp P=+D . 
7 The period discount factor can be written as 
iT e d
- =  where i is the market interest rate and T is the lag between 
periods. Therefore, as T increases d  decreases, and so does D. Note that for credence good, where quality is never 
ascertained, this translates by T ﬁ+¥ , implying  0 Dﬁ . 
8 One justification, given in Allen (1984), is consumers share information through publications like consumers' reports 
in magazines, market surveys or word-of-mouth reputation. 
9 For more explanation and results on a two-part tariff, see e.g. Tirole (1988). 7 / 7 
  The first steady-state equilibrium consists in selling the national brand product to consumers 
for ever. Since we normalized the branded product quality to qB=1, the retailer chooses the price pB 
maximizing: 




BBBBB pppp ￿￿￿￿ P=--+D-- ￿￿￿￿
ŁłŁł
  (6) 







=P=   (7) 
  The second possible equilibrium is for the retailer to sell the national brand product and to 
introduce its own private label good, incurring a fixed cost  F.
10 I n this article, brand loyalty is not 
modelled explicitly. Although it is an important feature when considering the introduction of a new 
good, it can be taken into account in our framework in two ways. First, consumers do not perceive 
the national brand as an experience good. This means that the national brand is a well- established 
product and so its quality is known. Second, the fixed cost element is assumed to reflect the degree 
of difficulty the new product has in coping with the loyalty of the existing one. In other words, if 
the private label  faces a very well established brand with loyal consumers, the cost in advertising 
and promotional campaigns should be higher. Therefore, in this framework, an increase in  F can be 
interpreted as an increase in the brand’s loyalty. 
 
  We assume that the national brand is of higher quality than the private label one:  qB>qS.
11 
The retailer  chooses the final prices for both products, but also the quality of its store brand. The 
program is thus: 
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10 Such a fixed cost could be illustrated by necessary advertisement in-store for the new product and a promotional 
campaign. 
11 This is a classic assumption made in the economic literature on private label as in Mills (1995) or Bontems, Monier 
and Réquillart (1999). It seems to fit quite well with facts, since consumers tend to judge the private label product as 
inferior to the national brand one, or at least not superior. See Rao and Monroe (1989) or Richardson, Dick and Jain 










  (12) 
  Note that the conditions required in equation (5) are fulfilled so long as 
8
9
c > . 
 
  The third possible equilibrium is for the retailer is to milk and misrepresent its store brand 
quality. Because consumers only observe quality after  consumption, the one period lag gives room 
for the retailer to cheat concerning  its store brand quality. By definition of a steady state equilibrium 
fulfilling consumers' expectations, the quality consumers anticipate is  qS
* as stated in equation  (10), 
sold at price pS
* from equation (11). Therefore the retailer can produce a poor-quality store brand at 
very low cost and sell it at price pS
* during the first period. During the second period, no consumers 
will buy the store brand again but some of them will consume the national brand.
12 There is 
therefore a gain for the retailer by cheating as it benefits from the first period private label 
discrimination revenues without incurring any cost. There is then  a second period loss because 
demand for the private label drops to zero. 
 
  Profit  in this third equilibrium  is given by the following expression in prices when 
reputation is sustained for period 1, as stated in equation  (11), and where the branded product price 
at period 2 is denoted  S p % : 




BBBSSSSBSS cpDppcqcpDppcqc ￿￿ P=-+- ￿￿
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  The optimal price for the national brand in the second period is thus 
3
4
S p = %  leading to a 
profit, when milking, equal to: 




ccccF P=+D--- %   (14) 
 
3.  The retailer's choice 
 
  The retailer’s choice over the three possible equilibria will rely on the three parameters of 
the model: c, F and D. 
 
                                                 
12 It could have been assumed that consumers cheated on the store brand retaliate against the retailer by not consuming 
its branded product again. Under such an assumption, these consumers' demand would vanish. However, assuming that 
cheated consumers do not just vanish but that some of them consume the national brand in the second period does not 
qualitatively change our results. 9 / 9 
Proposition 1 : The less-frequently purchased is the product (the lower is D)  or the 
more brand- loyal consumers are (the higher is F), the harder it is to introduce a 
reputable private label. 
    Production cost at the same level as the national brand (i.e. c=1) is 
not a sufficient condition to ensure a reputable private label, nor introduction of a 
private label good. 
 
  Proof :  
  The retailer will prefer to sell  the private label product  and sustain its store 















For c=1, this frontier can be prolonged by continuity:  ) , 1 ( ) , (
* 1 * F F c
c D ￿ ￿ﬁ ￿ D
ﬁ  
applying the L’Hospital rule, leading to  1 64 ) , 1 (
* - = D F F . 
The retailer prefers to introduce a reputable store brand rather than cheating 











% %  (16) 
  Because of continuity in profits and transitivity, comparing the trade-off 
between selling only the branded product and milking is not necessary. 
n 
Figure 1 depicts the optimal equilibrium for the retailer for its store brand introduction 
policy, illustrated with F=0.02. 
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Figure 1 : Introduction of the store brand, with F=0.02 
  One interesting trade-off for the retailer is  that  between maintaining the reputation of its 
private label and using its reputation  to milk consumers. It calls for two comments. The first is that 
the less patient is the retailer (the less frequently the product is purchased), the less credible is the 
store brand. Intuitively, an impatient retailer cares more about present profits than future ones. 
Therefore, its trade-off puts more weight on the gains from cheating (production costs saved) than 
on the future losses (foregone discrimination profits). The second comment, perhaps less intuitive, 
is that for a given discount factor, a decrease in  c increases the incentive for the retailer to milk. The 
frontier  D %  is indeed decreasing in  c. When  c is lower, that is when the national brand product has a 
smaller cost advantage, store brand quality increases and thus the total production costs ( ½ c q S . 
DS ) are also high. Gains  from  milking therefore increase as the saving of potential production  is 
cost higher. Besides, as quality of the own brand product becomes closer to the one of the branded 
good, discrimination profits decrease. Therefore, the loss for the retailer to milk  – that is the 
absence of the private label product in the second period – becomes less and less important. 
  Note that allowing the private label to have a slight advantage on the branded product (c<1) 
does not qualitatively change the results. 
 
The effect of considering the store brand as an experience good and not as a search good 
makes a difference. Without it, zone (1) would not exist. Indeed, in this zone, the retailer cannot 
sustain its reputation for its store brand. Because consumers anticipate that milking is more 
profitable for the distributor than sustaining reputation,  they do not buy the store brand. The new 
product is not credible for consumers and the retailer only effectively sells the national brand. By 
contrast with zone (2) where the store brand is not introduced because the fixed cost is too high 
compared to the revenues generated by the new product, zone (1) deters the private label 
introduction because of the experience dimension of the good. 
 
  A d ecrease in the cost of  private label  goods is not sufficient to explain their introduction by 
retailers, because  below  a certain threshold, the store brand is not credible anymore. The next 
section takes into account the bargaining power parameter of the retailer for analysing the 
determinants of store brand introduction. 
 
4.  Adding the retailer's bargaining power 
 
  In order to incorporate  retailer bargaining power into the model in a straightforward manner, 
we assume that the national brand manufacturer is also the private label manufacturer. Dobson 
(1998) and Dunne and Narasimahn (1999) give some examples  where this is the case. One 
consequence of this assumption is that the  retailer’s  bargaining power  will be used to split profit 
both  on the national brand product  and  on the store brand product  since  the manufacturer is the 11 / 11 
same for both goods. As a consequence of the national manufacturer also p roducing the private 
label, there is no cost disadvantage for the store brand product. Hence, c=1, and the unit cost of the 
private label production is  therefore 
2 1
2 S q . As is well known,  having  a two-part tariff  between the 
distributor and the producer means the wholesale price is set to unit cost (that is: wB=½ and wS=½ 
qS
2) and the  ex-post profit is divided according to the retailer's bargaining power parameter  a.
13 
However, because of reputation effects, the national brand manufacturer would not be keen to 
produce a very low quality store brand in order to assist the retailer's milking strategy. If the retailer 
decides to milk, we assume he therefore turns to an independent firm from the competitive fringe to 
produce the zero-quality store brand. In the milking equilibrium, parameter  a thus only applies to 
the national brand revenues but not to the store brand ones. 
 
Proposition 2: The greater is the retailer bargaining power, the more likely is the 
introduction of a reputable private label. 
 
  Proof : 
The ex-post profits in the three possible equilibria - equations (7), (12) and (14) - taking into 
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13 The Nash-Bargaining framework, detailed in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), leads to a retailer's  ex-post profit equal 
to a % of the vertical structure profits, whereas the manufacturer gets (1-a) % of it. The wholesale price maximizes the 
vertical structure profits (joint profits) whereas the franchise fee (not modelled here) allocates the surplus between the 
agents according to their bargaining power. 12 / 12 
The new situation is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Introduction of the store brand with the retailer's bargaining power, with F=0.02 
  An increase in bargaining power has two effects on the milking  reputation for the retailer. 
First, it obviously makes the introduction of the store brand more likely by giving the retailer more 
profit with  which  to cover the fixed cost F associated with the introduction of the new product. The 
second effect concerns reputation:  when  a increases, the  ex-post foregone profits of discrimination 
when the retailer milks also increase. This lowers the i ncentives for the retailer to cheat on store 
brand quality. 
  It is also interesting to note that, even if the bargaining power increases,  so  long as the 
frequency of purchase of the product is quite low ( (1) D<D % ), producing a high quality private label 
is not a credible strategy. 
 
  The recent mergers within the retailing industry can be reinterpreted as an increase of the 
retailer's bargaining power  vis-à-vis the manufacturer. In our model, this translates into a greater 
likelihood of the store brand being introduced  because  the benefits of reputation  become  more 
important. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
  The first general result of the paper is that considering the private label as an experience 
good  has a significant impact on the outcome. Indeed, for products characterised by a low 
frequency of purchase, a private label is not credible and the retailer cannot maintain his reputation. 13 / 13 
In addition, the decreasing marginal cost disadvantage of the private label production is not always 
sufficient to ensure that the private label will be introduced. 
  Consideration of the retailer's bargaining power can jeopardise the decision to introduce a 
private label. When the retailer bargaining power is high enough, it gives the distributor incentives 
to maintain its reputation by making the losses in case of milking too high. As previously, if the 
good is characterised by a low frequency of purchase, a high bargaining power is not sufficient to 
insure private label introduction. There  is indeed a threshold under which a reputable brand is not 
viable. 
 
  These conclusions can give some insight into why, for some products such as Hot Beverages 
or Health & Beauty (goods with  low frequency of purchase compared to groceries), retailers' private 
label have a rather small market share (24.4 % in average). Of course, reputation is not the only 
factor in explaining the market share of the own-brand product because investment in brand and 
product image (advertising) are also important. In our model, we focussed on the reputation effect. 
Such an effect in not present when considering a private label as a search good because consumers 
have all the information and only look for the best 'quality/price' value. 
 
  In order to simplify the  analysis,  downstream  competition is not  modelled  in this  paper. In 
fact, introducing downstream competition will give consumers the opportunity to buy at another 
retailer's shop if they anticipate the retailer will milk. In the second period, the retailer will therefore 
earn zero profits rather than  some  profit due to the captive demand on the branded product. This 
implies that the presence of downstream competition will lessen the incentives retailers have to 
milk, but not remove them. 
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